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image (SI) view (2, 3) holds that our understanding of mental disorders must come, wholly and solely, from
the sciences of the mind, unfettered by FP. This paper argues that the FP view is problematic because it is too
limited: There is more to the mind than FP allows; hence, we must look beyond FP for properly deep and
illuminating explanations of mental disorders. SI promises just this. But when cast in its standard cognitivist
formulations, SI is unnecessarily and unjustifiably neurocentric. After rejecting both the FP view, in its pure
form, and SI view, in its popular cognitivist renderings, this paper concludes that a more liberal version of SI
can accommodate what is best in both views - once SI is so formulated and the FP view properly edited and
significantly revised, the two views can be reconciled and combined to provide a sound philosophical basis for
a future psychiatry.
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Philosophy of psychiatry faces a tough choice between two competing ways of understanding mental disorders. The folk psychology (FP) view puts our everyday normative
conceptual scheme in the driver’s seat – on the assumption that it, and it only, tells
us what mental disorders are (1). Opposing this, the scientific image (SI) view (2, 3)
holds that our understanding of mental disorders must come, wholly and solely, from the
sciences of the mind, unfettered by FP. This paper argues that the FP view is problematic
because it is too limited: there is more to the mind than FP allows; hence, we must look
beyond FP for properly deep and illuminating explanations of mental disorders. SI promises just this. But when cast in its standard cognitivist formulations, SI is unnecessarily
and unjustifiably neurocentric. After rejecting both the FP view, in its pure form, and SI
view, in its popular cognitivist renderings, this paper concludes that a more liberal version
of SI can accommodate what is best in both views – once SI is so formulated and the
FP view properly edited and significantly revised, the two views can be reconciled and
combined to provide a sound philosophical basis for a future psychiatry.
Keywords: philosophy of mind, narrative therapy, cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of psychiatry, philosophy
of cognitive science

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
Hamlet Act I, Scene 5, 167–8

FOLK PSYCHOLOGY RULES
How should we best understand, categorize, and treat mental disorders? A familiar answer in
philosophical circles is that any approach to mental health must always operate with reference to
the normative features that define our folk psychological (FP) understanding of mind. Call this
the FP view of mental disorders and psychiatry. Its driving assumptions are that FP, and only FP,
conceptually defines what it is to have a mind because FP, and FP alone, supplies the necessary and
sufficient mark of the mental, emphasizing its essentially rational character. On the standard, narrow
reading, FP plays this governing role precisely because it is understood to be the commonsense
theory or conceptual scheme that reveals how mental states – typically assumed to be propositional
attitudes – interact in the rational production of behavior and action.
Graham (1), a staunch spokesperson for the FP view, advances a theory of mental disorder according to which we have no choice but to make reference to reason and rationality when understanding
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such phenomena because such features “help to constitute and
define distinctively mental activity such as believing, hoping,
desiring, deciding, thinking and the like” [(1), p. 7].
The main idea behind this vision is that FP supplies the only
normative standard of what minds are and how they operate. Hence,
only against FP’s standard is it even possible to detect and demarcate
mental disorders. Mental disorders arise when things go awry with
us at some level, when in some important sense, a person fails to
live up to or systematically violates the standards of rationality that
characterize our everyday folk psychological ways of thinking. There
may be various mental and non-mental causes of such failures. But,
simply put, FP is the necessary reference point of what a normatively
defined well-functioning mind looks like and what its rational
characteristics are. Disordered minds, by comparison, are less than
flourishing minds that fail to meet that normative standard.
Even though proponents of the FP view accept that perfect
rationality is a notoriously slippery notion that evades precise
analysis they insist, nonetheless, that, “rationality is essential to
mindedness” [(1), p. 12]. Moreover, it is assumed that rationality is only something exhibited by whole persons and not by the
operations of their subpersonal parts. Putting all of this together, in
standard formulations, the FP view holds that we have no choice but
to understand minds by making use of FP concepts, which apply to
persons whose intentional attitudes exhibit an inherent rationality.

view is that this can only be achieved by means of some kind of
conceptual analysis or radical interpretation [see, e.g., Ref. (5)].
With these assumptions about the essential characteristics of
minds in place, the FP view of mental disorders firmly opposes
what, by its lights, is its only possible rival, a scientifically orientated, non-mentalistic FP-eliminativist approach – one that looks
solely to neuroscience to discern “the best understanding of and
treatment for mental disorder” [(1), p. 6]. A purely brain-based
approach to mental disorders is oxymoronic from the perspective
of those who hold that FP defines the mental; such an approach
might tell us much about non-mental disorders of various kinds,
but it could not be a starting point of inquiry into psychiatry
because it misses out the mental altogether. Despite insisting on
this point, fans of the FP view do not deny that neuroscience can
play a part in the larger business of psychiatry. They do insist,
however, that the part the brain sciences can play is always and
everywhere secondary, servile, and subservient. Crucially, the
FP view of psychiatry “does not relinquish the theory (of mental
disorders) to, but deploys, brain science” [(1), p. 9].
Although clearly incompatible with a purely scientific, eliminativist vision of psychiatry, the FP view is compatible with making
explanatory use of a range of scientific findings. The sciences of the
mind have something important to add to the story so long as they
take their direction from FP when it comes to understanding and
classifying mental disorders on the basis of possible causes. There
is no contradiction to be found in such a cooperative enterprise for
those who think FP defines the mind: but this is so only as long as
it is accepted that FP must always remain in the driver’s seat when
coordinating any such combined efforts [(1), p. 11].3
The logic is straightforward. Mental disorders – on the FP
view – only ever show up as disturbances within the space of
reasons. Even so, there can be non-mental causes of mental
disorders. We can think of such causes as arational, non-mental
disorder influences that, to use Graham’s apt phrase, “gum up”
“the rational works” [(1), p. 160]. Non-mental factors – the influences of brain and behavior – can interfere with and upset our
rationally constrained mentality. Accordingly, non-mental factors
can contribute to and help explain the occurrence of mental disorders – and this can happen even if the non-mental mechanisms in
question are in perfect order and are operating just as they should.4
All in all, the FP view insists on a particular understanding of
the explanatory relations that can hold between the mental and the

Thinking of intentional attitudes (beliefs, desires, and so
on) as presupposing the rationality of persons makes it
clear that we persons are purposive or goal directed in
behavior and that how we act or behave depends on our
purposes or reasons for acting [(1), p. 120].
Graham (1) dubs this the rationality-in-intentionality (RIT)
thesis for short. RIT takes rationality to be the hallmark of the
mental – one that sets the mental forever apart from all other
kinds of phenomena, and this is what makes the mental irreducibly autonomous.1 The autonomy of the mental thesis can be
understood in more or less realistic terms. Yet in all versions the
root idea, subscribed to by all fans of the FP view, is this: propositional attitudes can only be ascribed, or only have life, when
they stand in appropriate kinds of holistically and normatively
defined rational relations. Mental phenomena exist if and only if
the relevant forms of rationality are in place: viz. they live in the
space of reasons. This is allegedly why when rationality is absent,
we must switch to another scheme for understanding the relevant
phenomena; in such cases, a move to non-mental concepts and
explanatory schemes becomes necessary precisely because minds,
properly understood, are fading or absent.
The crucial assumption of the FP view is that it is the job of
philosophy of mind to reveal and articulate the essential contours
of our commonsense understanding of the mind – which are
assumed to be the only bona fide conception of mind.2 The standard

absolutely essential role in defining what minds are and, hence derivatively, what
mental disorders are. Accordingly, “the mind qua mind puts its inscription on the
sources of a disorder. We cannot recognize a mental disorder without uncovering
that mark” [(1), p. 11]. It is because of the need for benchmarking against the mark
of the mental – which can only be done via FP – that “no conceptually regimented
and normatively informed theory of mental disorder can be devised without taking
philosophy of mind seriously” [(1), p. 1].
3
Thus in line with this, Graham (1) argues that going the FP-governed way ought
not to encourage one to endorse the DSM atheoretical method of classifying and
characterizing mental disorders.
4
For example, Graham (1) illustrates the latter point vividly by reminding us that,
“an addict … does not possess a broken brain” (p. 179). The reason this can be so,
Graham (1) claims, is because, “The brain, in general, is not hard-wired for personal prudence. Neural activity may systematically underwrite unwise behaviors
without exemplifying a breakdown or something wrong or damaged in its wetware
or machinery” (p. 178).

1
The FP view endorses the irreducibility claim about the mind, which Davidson
championed long ago: “The reason mental concepts cannot be reduced to physical
concepts is the normative character of mental concepts” [(4), p. 46].
2
Those who take the autonomy thesis seriously – whether in strongly realist or more
interpretationist renderings – maintain that an FP understanding of mind plays an
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non-mental when it comes to making sense of mental disorders.
Neuroscience can help us to understand, for example, the condition of the unwilling addict because reference to brute arational
neural mechanisms can help “to explain why addicts suffer from
relapse in spite of themselves” [(1), p. 179, emphasis added]. Nonmental mechanisms – whether malfunctioning or not – feature
in the larger story of specific mental disorders because they may
explain what interferes with the rational works. Telling the right
story about such non-mental influences is complicated by the fact
that there can be “different hypotheses about the irruptive role of
a-rational neurobiological/neurochemical mechanisms into the
space of reasons” [(1), p. 178].
Speaking on behalf of the FP vision of psychiatry, Graham (1)
sees no difficulty in asserting that, “even though mental disorders
are not brain disorders, neuroscience helps to illuminate their
nature” [(1), p. 13, emphasis added]. How should we understand
this claim? It deserves attention for, as just noted above, the
FP view holds that the essence of mental disorders can only be
understood with reference to what occurs in the space of reasons.
Accordingly, explanations that cite non-mental goings-on from
outside that space can only shine a light on the nature of mental
disorders if we distinguish the essential characteristics of the latter
from explanations that tell a fuller story about their actual natures
(or, more likely, how non-mental mechanisms make an actual but
effective difference in particular cases).
This requires drawing a distinction between the essence of
mental disorders and their actual natures. A standard way to do
this is to take a leaf out of the analytic playbook of commonsense
functionalism (6–8). Analytic functionalists hold that our everyday folk theories or practices conceptually define what minds
are, fully and completely. On this score, the so-called sciences of
the mind reveal nothing about the essential features of minds.
Prima facie, this may seem extreme. However, adopting this
view is entirely compatible with the idea that the sciences can
discover much about how mental phenomena are, as a matter
of fact, instantiated in the actual world – hence, the sciences can
discover much about their actual nature. They can do so once
FP tells “empirical inquiry what to look for” [(2), p. 51]. If we
distinguish the essential and actual characteristics of mental
phenomena and, relatedly, mental disorders, it becomes possible
to understand how the sciences can assist with an understanding
of the nature of mental disorders on the FP view. Pace Locke, on
this vision, it is the scientists of mind, not the philosophers of
mind, who must do the under-laboring.

Adherents of the SI view are self-styled progressives. They
insist that psychiatric explanation and nosology should not
be regimented by, or beholden to, commonsense intuitions or
assumptions. Psychiatric explanations, they hold, require no
guidance, warrant, or mandate from FP. Proponents of the SI view
insist that the future of the mental health field depends on fully
embracing the sciences of the mind. The core assumption is that
the sciences provide the requisite tools for a free inquiry into the
nature of mental disorders. Moreover, the scientific work is to be
conducted without requiring any appeal to commonsense notions
of the mind, as filtered and understood through philosophy.
In place of the FP vision of psychopathology, Murphy (2) sets
out his stall for a revisionary objectivism about the nature of
mind. Accordingly, the bid is to discover what minds are through
the development of a pragmatic and open-ended, scientifically
driven conceptual framework, one that is revisable in practice and
one that rests on testing out a series of empirical bets about mental phenomena.5 Crucially, the scientific investigations Murphy
envisages would not be shackled by FP’s oversight. On the SI
vision, to truly explain and classify normal and abnormal minds,
we must look to our best cognitive sciences and to those alone.6
An immediate consequence of embracing the SI view is that
it open up the scope of what we might think of as the mental
and how we might think of it, quite considerably. By implication,
the same goes for mental disorders. For example, given that perception is a paradigmatically mental phenomenon, it turns out
that, on the SI view, blindness – however counterintuitive it may
seem – counts not just as a disorder of the visual system but as a
mental disorder [(2), p. 54, 55–57]. Murphy is happy to bite this
and other, similar bullets. The justification is simple: violating a
few folk intuitions is a small price to pay if going the purely SI way
puts psychiatry on a “sounder footing” [(2), p. 11].
This is all very well and good as a sort of SI position statement
but what justifies taking the SI path? Why suppose that SI might
reveal new and deeper facts about how minds operate and how
they can go wrong?7 Why not hold that the sciences of the mind
do whatever good work they do by functioning in exactly the
way the FP view says they do – viz. by supplying “the empirical
application of our pre-theoretic folk concepts” [(2), p. 50]?
The most straightforward and compelling answer is that there
is surely more to the mental than dreamed of by FP. This conclusion is hard, if not impossible, to resist if FP characterizes the
mental wholly in terms of the propositional attitudes and how

PSYCHIATRY IN THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGE

5
In pressing for this future vision of mental health as wholly grounded in science,
Murphy (2) laments that much contemporary psychiatry actively shies away from
theory (as exemplified in the avowed theory-neutrality of the DSMs). Against the
diagnostic descriptivism of the DSMs, he maintains that psychiatry must aim to
find out how things “really are” with mental disorders and what underlies them.
The only way psychiatry can do this, and thus secure its future, would be to take
advantage of and actively contribute to developments in the cognitive sciences.
6
A psychiatry cast in the scientific image must assume that, “what counts as normal
human nature is decided by a variety of disciplines that comprise the cognitive and
biological sciences” [(2), p. 11].
7
Murphy (2) is certainly right that there is a real and urgent need for psychiatry to
address the issues that lie at the heart of the debate between FP and SI views. For
the troubling fact is that, “psychiatry as it stands is not a particularly mature or
successful enterprise” [(2), p. 10].

The FP view of psychiatry has some fierce critics. It has been
accused of presenting an unjustifiably restrictive vision of the role
the sciences of mind play in mental health. Advancing the idea
that psychiatry needs to be grounded entirely in the cognitive
sciences, Murphy (2) is the foremost defender of the scientific
image (SI) view of psychiatry. He and his friends see the FP view
as unacceptable because it denies the sciences of the mind a free
hand in revealing the essential character of mental phenomena.
That restriction, SIers hold, results in an unwarranted fettering of
psychiatric explanations and classifications [(2), p. 48, 51].
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they rationally inter-relate. For on any such a rendering, there is
every reason to believe that

the medical model of psychiatry such that the work of psychiatry
becomes that of tracing “abnormalities in behavior and cognition
to specific causal factors that are realized in brain tissue” [(2), p.
13, emphasis added].
In Murphy’s mind, adoption of the SI view leads naturally
to firmly recommending a merger of psychiatry and clinical
neuropsychology.9 He is supremely confident that a purely neurobased approach will dominate the future of psychiatry. This is
evinced by his commitment to neurocomputationalism, input–
output functionalism, modules, and so on. But why assume that
the brain’s the thing? Retort: Who seriously doubts it? Murphy tells
us that, “After all, everyone knows that psychological phenomena,
like all human behavior, are rooted in brain processes” [(2), p. 9,
emphasis added]. How should we interpret the “everyone knows
that” operator in this statement and what epistemic backing does
it have? There are several possibilities.
The first is to go “Folk Analytic.” Perhaps we can appeal to
folk intuitions about the mind to justify talk about what everyone
knows about the brain basis of minds. Clearly, this is a non-starter
for SIers. The SI view precludes making any appeal to hypothesized folk theories and the intuitions they sponsor in order to
explain the epistemic credentials of “everyone knows” talk. Folk
intuitions can give no backing to SI friendly claims about what
everyone knows; hence, they cannot help justify the claim that
cognition is wholly caused by and realized in the brain as opposed
to having a wider and non-exclusively neural basis. Put simply,
to adopt the SI view of psychiatry is to forego making appeals to
folk intuitions in order to defend claims about “what everyone
knows” about the mental. Call that Murphy’s Law. Murphy too
must abide by it.
The second way to go might be to appeal to consensus in this
matter in the philosophy of cognitive science. Classical cognitivist
approaches to cognition promote a brainbound account of cognitive processes by adopting a representationalist and internalist
account of the vehicles of cognition. If everyone in the field agrees
that cognition is always and everywhere content involving and
that the vehicles of mental content are neural, then this would
justify claiming that “everyone knows” neurocentrism to be
true. The best cognitive explanations of behavior can, in effect,
“throw away the world” and focus solely, and solipsistically, on the
properties that supervene on the current internal neural states of
cognizers (11–14).
SIers would be justified in saying that psychiatry ought to take
an exclusive interest in brains if classical cognitivism were true.
The trouble, for Murphy and followers, is that classical cognitivism may not be true, and – as things stand – it is far from a safe
bet to assume that it is. More to the point, looking at the state of
the philosophy of cognitive science, it can be safely said that classical cognitivism is not known to be true. There are deep-seated,

mind has an existence and substantive character
that goes well beyond, and is independent of our best
common-sense interpretative practices. Hence knowing the truth about the mind requires a great deal more
than informed reflection on those practices. In fact, it
requires cognitive science [(9), xiv, emphases added].
A full understanding of all that is mental cannot be limited
to FP characterizations alone. There are many aspects of
mind – even quite ordinary, everyday ones – such as the complex ways that perceiving and acting interact – upon which FP,
as construed above, has simply nothing to say. Such examples
multiply. There are many forms and aspects of mentality that
can only be understood by engaging in modes of inquiry that
go beyond interrogating FP as traditionally conceived. FP casts
no light on the properties and dynamics of basic minds [for an
extensive discussion, see Ref. (10)].
Call this the “More to the Mind than FP” objection. It strikes
at the core assumptions of the official FP view. Notably, however,
even if the “More to the Mind than FP” objection defeats or should
make us suspicious about the FP view, it does not, by itself, justify
adopting the pure SI vision. For even if there is “More to the Mind
than FP,” it does not follow that our understanding of minds, and
by implication mental disorders, can only and wholly be supplied
by the sciences of the mind.
In the end, because FP is not the whole story about minds,
it will be argued that going the SI way is best – but only if SI is
carefully qualified. Why so? Because FP is part of the story of the
mental: arguably, important aspects of human minds can only be
understood in FP terms. This can be so even if FP assumptions
about the mind should not be the basis for or otherwise restrict
our investigations into the fundamental nature of minds. Before
attempting to show how to marry these ideas in Section “Keeping
FP in the Picture,” the next two sections raise important doubts
about standard cognitivist formulations of the SI view and their
inherent neurocentrism.

A CERTAIN IRONY
The SI view is open to understanding the mind in new ways
that go beyond FP. Despite the essential openness of the SI view,
some of its most prominent proponents have tried to foreclose
on certain possibilities. Based on assumptions about what the
best explanations in the cognitive sciences will look like, some
campaign for a neuro-based cognitivist version of the SI view. For
example, under SI’s auspices, Murphy offers a defense of the idea
that, “psychiatry is a branch of medicine dedicated to uncovering
the neurological basis of disease entities” [(2), p. 10, emphasis
added].8 For him, going the SI way paves the way for adopting

9
Such a merger, he holds, is “necessary to develop the broadest and most fertile
approach to understanding psychopathology” [(2), p. 12]. In saying this, he does
not promote a crude reductionism. He does not assume that neuropsychology
offers molecular explanations or that its explanations are somehow more fundamental. Nevertheless, he holds, neuropsychological explanations have a privileged
status: they provide a special understanding that affords unique possibilities for
intervening upon and treating mental disorders.

8
Murphy’s (2) defense is admittedly qualified because he admits there are limits to
our understanding when it comes to naturalizing and mechanizing central reasoning processes such that it may turn out that a proper scientific understanding of the
latter might never be attainable.
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on-going philosophical debates about the character of cognition
and the reach of cognitive processes – and these debates are far
from being conclusively settled.
Murphy is well aware of these debates and their import. His
official word on the matter in 2006 was to note that, “Some
pictures of the mind stress embodiment very heavily … Others
prescind from details of our embodiment to stress a more purely
computational theory of the mental … what counts as the mental
depends in part on who is right in these debates” [(2), p. 64].
Despite this acknowledgment, Murphy thinks there is really no
doubt that the sciences of mind will stick to providing explanations in terms of brain-based, semantic representations. This he
takes to be a settled issue – even if, in the end, the hypothesized
brain-based representations in question turn out not to have
contentful properties of the FP sort.10
However, what exactly are the defining properties of representations, as defined solely by the sciences of the mind, without any
reference to the kinds of content understood by FP? How should
we understand the disagreements between representationalist
and non-representationalist if we do not appeal to some notion
of content as supplied by FP or some other agreed upon non-FP
theory (15)? And without agreement about the defining properties of representations understood in non-FP terms – which
might be supplied if we had a well-developed non-FP theory of
content – how are we to decide where the boundaries of mind
and cognition lie? How are we to determine whether – in the
end – the best explanations of sciences of the mind will be given in
terms of “inputs” and “outputs” that are purely neural as opposed
to involving extraneural factors too (16)?
Against this backdrop, Murphy’s confidence in an exclusively
representationalist and neuro-focused future for psychiatry will
seem, at best, premature – and at worst, it will look like a groundless pledge of allegiance. For the fact is there is no agreement in
the philosophy of cognitive science that supports the idea that
everyone knows – at least, not yet – that psychological phenomena are rooted or realized exclusively in brain processes.
But wait. Surely, we are looking for consensus in the wrong
place. The fact that philosophers – of the mind or otherwise – disagree about important topics is hardly news. Perhaps
there is yet another, more properly scientific consensus that we
can appeal to in order to make good on the “everyone knows”
claim. Doesn’t a quick glance at the current agreement in the
theoretical commitments of actual scientists of the mind secure
its truth? The great bulk of scientists of the mind do talk of neural
and mental representations in free and easy ways these days. Does
it follow that they are committed to a cognitivist take on mental
representations of the sort described above – one that would

justify neurocentrism? Establishing that would require serious
and detailed interpretative work: it would need to be shown that
the representational talk of scientists has all of the relevant commitments and that it is more than nominally unified. It is far from
obvious that this is the case. One major problem is that no unified
theory of representation currently exists. Worse still, if we look at
the current state of cognitive science there does not seem to be a
single, settled story to tell about which theoretical tools – representational or non-representational – are primary or the best ones
to use when it comes to understanding cognition and explaining
intelligent activity. We seem to be living in a mixed economy. If
this is right, then there is not an existing scientific consensus SIers
can point to in order to justify the claim that “everyone knows”
cognition to be brainbound.
On top of this, even if such a current consensus did exist – even
if all good cognitive scientists turned out to be representationalists
in the relevant sense – more work would be needed in order to
determine whether the entities and properties they posit now will
stand the test of time. It is always possible that even if all cognitive scientists are currently committed to neural representations
still, it might turn out that something with different properties
will best explain the relevant phenomena. Cognitive science is,
after all, an unfinished business. Hence, even if today’s scientists
did have common commitments that would justify adopting
neurocentrism, we might still worry that any such contingent
fact would not provide a secure basis for making firm predictions
about the future of psychiatry. The official story is that not long
ago cognitivism replaced old school behaviorism, right? Science is
shifty – but in a good way. The SI view should surely embrace that.
At this stage of the game, there seems to be no obvious justification for fans of the SI view to reject the idea that psychiatry might
look beyond the brain when it comes to understanding, explaining, and treating psychopathological disorders. Indeed, there are
positive reasons for thinking that it is fruitful to look beyond the
brain when it comes to understanding mental phenomena (16).
Notably, since looking beyond the brain does not entail ignoring
the brain, adopting such a liberal SI view is perfectly in line with a
modified version of Murphy’s assertion that “we are animals with
a biology including a brain that is [part of] the foundation of our
mental life” [(2), p. 10].
Still, it might be thought that the foregoing liberal assessment is too blithe, quick, and programmatic. Aren’t there good
grounds for thinking that cognitive science will remain deeply
committed to cognitivism and neurocentrism, even if in the final
reckoning, it deviates in some matters of detail from the classical
versions of those views? Aren’t there special reasons for favoring
cognitivism – reasons that we can identify here and now – that
would justify neurocentrism and thus rule out more radical and
extensive possibilities for understanding the nature and extent of
cognition. That seems to be the line of several prominent defenders of cognitivist variants of the SI view (2, 3).

10
Thus, in a forthcoming paper, Murphy writes, “The question whether science
makes use of representational systems isn’t really open to doubt any longer: many
areas of psychology and neuroscience take for granted the existence of semantic
interpretations of internal states of some cognitive system. The assumption that
inputs and outputs to and from components of the brain represent distal features
of the world has been part of neuroscience since the nineteenth century. What is
open to doubt is whether representation, as used in the sciences of mind, has the
properties that philosophers have found in intentional content, as presupposed by
folk psychology. I am not taking a stand on that … ” (Murphy D. Brains and Beliefs
(Unpublished)).
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In defending their predictions about the rightful dominance of
an SI-based medical model, Murphy and Smart (17) make it
clear that this future is to be secured by cognitive neuroscience
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and not merely some brutal brain science. What makes cognitive
neuroscience special, they maintain, is that it posits subpersonal
information-processing mechanisms that are at once both
causal–mechanical and intentional in character. It is because it
blends the cognitive with the neural that cognitive neuroscience
has unique explanatory power: it, alone, allows for an integrated
scientific story to be told about minds.
Looking exclusively at what goes on in brains is apparently
justified because of the depth and unity cognitive neuroscientific
explanations can provide. Gerrans (3) makes this case in great
detail.11 He argues that cognitive neuroscience understands,
“persons as complex, hierarchically-organized informationprocessing systems implemented in neural wetware” [(3), p.
16].12 Seeing persons as brain based, in turn, allegedly confers
peculiar advantages because it puts us in a position, for example,
to “show how facts identified and explained by disciplines operating at ‘levels’ such as molecular neurobiology or neuroanatomy
can explain psychological and phenomenological level facts that
give delusion its clinical profile” [(3), p. 20, emphases added].13
What makes having a cognitive theory pitched at the subpersonal
information-processing level so uniquely valuable is that it is
needed to “bridge the gap between neurobiological and personal
level explanation” [(3), p. 21, emphasis added].
Integrated explanations of the promised kind are said to
be unavailable, in principle, to the isolationist FP view: this is
precisely because to adopt the latter’s “space of reasons” idea
enforces an absolute distinction between the intentional and the
mechanical.
To see what makes cognitive theory so appealing, it is worth
getting clear about what exactly the FP view allegedly cannot do.
Gerrans (3) accuses its proponents of operating with a disunified
framework – one in which mechanisms are assumed to make only
a causal difference to cognitive goings-on in a way that debars
them from being properly explanatory (p. 15, 20). For example,
Gerrans characterizes the FP view as being committed to the idea
that organic damage might “play a causal role in introducing the
drastic change in psychological structure but plays no explanatory
role” [(3), p. 27, emphases added]. Does it make sense to think the
explanatory space could carve up in the way Gerrans suggests?

Can we distinguish between something’s playing a merely causal
versus a properly explanatory role? How should we understand
this distinction?
As discussed in Section “Folk Psychology Rules,” proponents of
the FP view clearly allow that mental phenomena can be explained
by what goes on in non-mental mechanisms. The FP view may be
limited in that it is not interested in, or simply fails to provide,
very detailed stories about the non-mental causal contributions
of implementation mechanisms in information-processing terms.
But it cannot be faulted for ruling out, or making it impossible to
tell, such deeper explanatory stories. So this alone cannot be what
makes its rival, the cognitivist view, special.14
Apparently, what makes cognitive theory special is that it
brings something else – something quite unique – to the table.
It regards the mind as a complex information-processing system – one that is organized in a hierarchical way, with a variety
of interacting processes playing specific roles and where some
of these diverse processes are responsible for the supervision of
others in the system. Understanding the mind through the lens of
cognitive theory allegedly provides a peculiar sort of intelligibility – one that allows theorists to go beyond the telling of merely
“difference making” causal stories. The cognitive theory allows us
to see how everything fits together in a systematic way; it bridges
the gaps and enables explanations at many different scales and
levels to be integrated by detailing how information flows from
level to level and what role particular processes play in the wider
cognitive economy [(3), p. 48, see also 32, 53, 79, 103].
From this vantage point, it is easy to see the attraction of having a broader vision of the mind that seeks to understand the
roles played by various forms of cognitive activity, how various
aspects of mind relate to and interact with one another, and how
specific disturbances in those relations and interactions can lead
to mental disorders with signature profiles.
This much is welcome. Yet friends of cognitivist SI, such
as Gerrans (3), go further than this: they suggest that only
cognitive neuroscience has what it takes to do the required
integrating work. As Gerrans (3) says, “the essential idea of
cognitive neuropsychiatry is that without a cognitive theory
the problem identified by autonomy theorists … cannot be

11
Gerrans (3) follows Murphy’s lead of treating the SI view as best seen through the
lens of a “minimalist cognitivism” (p. 18). Like Murphy, he sees that the future of
mental health resides with brain sciences of the cognitive variety. He too regards
psychiatry “as a branch of cognitive neuroscience by employing cognitive models
that do not abstract away from, but are sensitive to, details of neural implementation” [(3), p. 37].
12
On this vision, “personhood is a cognitive phenomenon constituted by the fact
that personal-level phenomena, such as feelings, beliefs, emotions and desires
arise at the highest levels of a cognitive processing hierarchy whose nature can
be described and explained” [(3), p. 21]. Human cognition is thus “a complex
hierarchy of computational processes performed by neural circuitry” [(3), p. 30].
13
Motivating this proposal, with a Parthian shot at the perceived limits of the
FP view, Gerrans (3) stresses that, “collecting and collating correlations between
neural, phenomenological and cognitive properties of the delusional mind is useful
but we need a theoretical approach that fits all this information together” (p. 14). It is
here that we meet the idea that the tools of cognitive neuroscience are uniquely well
suited to integrating “evidence from different disciplines about the way the mind
configures itself in response to incoming information according to the way neural
mechanisms influence cognitive processing” [(3), p. 14].

14
There is great potential for confusion and conflation about just what the FP
view and cognitive theory might, respectively, have to offer in terms of deeper
explanations. As Section “Folk Psychology Rules” made clear, the FP view allows
that we can go to a different level of description in order to get deeper explanations of mental disorders. Remarkably, in some places, Gerrans (3) talks in ways
that suggest cognitive theory is wholly at peace with the FP view’s suggestion
that underlying neural mechanisms only ever explain by describing implementing mechanisms of cognitive phenomena. As he writes: “It is normal practice to
explain phenomena such as amnesia or macular degeneration in terms of the way
neural circuits implement the cognitive processes involved in memory or perception.
This suggests that the way to explain psychology and phenomenology in terms of
neurobiology is via a cognitive theory” [(3), p. 15, emphasis added]. If this were
the whole story, it would be hard to distinguish what cognitive theory could offer
that is really different from what the FP view offers. Yet, there are reasons to think
this is neither the whole story about what cognitive theory has to offer nor the right
one. In an unpublished paper, Murphy (forthcoming) upbraids Gerrans for talking
about explanations of mental disorders by appeal to implementation mechanisms.
By Murphy’s lights, such talk is just an unfortunate hangover of the philosophical
tendency to mix up analytic functionalism with cognitive psychology.
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cast as person-level phenomena, to be sure. Instead it offers us
a “content-in-intentionality” or CIT mark of the mental.16 For
those who accept something like CIT, even though the cognitive
is regarded as quite a mixed bag that reaches across the so-called
subpersonal and personal levels it is also united by the intelligible relations that are instantiated through the processing of
informational and representational content in ways that define
minds.
Some philosophers hold that cognitive scientists are committed to essentially characterizing minds in information-processing
terms. This is, of course, not news. We frequently hear that

solved. The gap between neurobiology and psychology will be
unbridgeable” [(3), p. 36]. Hence, “there must be an explanatory
relationship between neuroscience and folk psychology” [(3),
p. 33, emphasis added]. These are very strong, philosophically
“musty” claims – and they are not self-evidently true.15 We might
well doubt that cognitive neuroscience per se is best placed to
provide the desired integrating theoretical vision, especially in
light of the concerns raised about Murphy’s neurocentrism in
the previous section.
What might persuade us that a brain-based cognitive theory
is necessary to bridge the putative gaps? Allegedly, that cognitive
neuroscience supplies special means for understanding the links
between various mental phenomena. It can do so, again allegedly,
precisely because it endorses a vision of the neurally housed mind
“organised as a hierarchical system … which uses representations
of the world and its own states to control behaviour” [(3), p. 47,
emphasis added]. The claim is that cognitive theory posits neural
representations that perform a variety of cognitive tasks and
that once we understand how information flows between such
representations, we will be in a position to provide complete
and satisfying explanations of mental disorders in ways which
make the links between subpersonal to personal-level cognitive phenomena intelligible. Thus, Gerrans (3) observes of this
general strategy that, ultimately, supplying the correct account
of what drives specific delusions requires accounting for “the
way the brain encodes information acquired in experience and
then reconstructs representations of that information when
subsequently cued” (p. 33).
It seems that the central posits of cognitive theory – information and representation – provide the perfect theoretical glue
for integrated explanations. Cognitive neuroscience promises
to show how there can be relevant connections between various
cognitive activities in a way that does not just cite correlations
or brute causal relations. Instead, cognitive neuroscience alone
proves to be genuinely explanatory of mental disorders because
it alone makes intelligible multilevel interactions across various
scales and levels.
Allegedly, cognitive neuroscience alone can achieve this
feat because it is wedded to a representational theory of mind
that assumes cognition to be at root both mechanical and
intentional. Importantly, cognitive theory seems to provide us
a new mark of the mental – not “rationality-in-intentionality”

cognitive science … has as its subject matter capacities
like memory, perception, attention, language processing
and reasoning. The concepts that cognitive sciences take
to be essential for understanding their domain include
information, representations, and algorithms [(19),
p. 74, emphasis added].
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Shapiro (19) is
right in thinking that working cognitive scientists take themselves
to use and need these kinds of conceptual tools. Would this help
fans of the cognitivist SI view to justify the claim that cognitive
neuroscience operates with unique explanatory tools that give it
special gap-closing powers?
Would assuming CIT make cognitive neuroscience ideally
well placed to provide gap-bridging solutions? One reason for
thinking so is that CIT seems to imply the existence of something
like a neurally based space of reasons. To posit a space of reasons
mark II would be to assume that there exists a cognitive level at
which various mental phenomena do not just brutally interact
but intelligibly inter-relate because they communicate by trafficking in contentful information and representations. Content
would, on this picture, be the shared common coin traded by all
cognitive phenomena. The CIT picture seems to make it possible
to understand cognitive relations in explanatorily illuminating
ways that do not reduce to the giving of merely brutal, causal
explanations.
Let us imagine that cognitive neuroscience posits a neural
space of reasons, ala CIT, and embraces internalism about the
vehicles of various mental contents. If so (assuming the above
analysis is correct), it would follow that cognitive neuroscience
would have utterly special resources for bridging the sort of gaps
of which Gerrans (3) speaks. All that would have to be done
to seal the deal would be to show in detail how the cognitive
neuroscience, as imagined above, could use those resources to in
fact close such gaps. Doing all of this would be an effective way
of motivating an exclusively neurocentric version of the SI view.
Before assessing whether cognitive neuroscience, so construed, really has what it takes to close the said gaps, it is important

15
For example, elsewhere, Gerrans speaks of the “necessary role of cognitive theory
in linking the neurobiological and phenomenological levels of explanation” [(3),
p. 18, emphasis added]. Methodologically speaking, it is strange that Gerrans (3)
makes appeal to such general and wholesale philosophical justifications, for when
pinning his philosophical colors to the mast he clearly tells us that: “Murphy is
right. Our best understanding of the mind comes from understanding cognitive
architecture. However that argument cannot be established a priori for all mental
phenomena. The best we can do is construct, revise and, ultimately, unify case-bycase explanations” [(3), p. 14, emphases added]. This fits better with his more retail
defenses of cognitive theory, such as when he claims that the “cognitive theory of
visuo-motor control embedded in the overall architecture of cognitive control … is
required to explain why high levels of activity in these regions produce loss of a
sense of agency” [(3), p. 18, emphasis added], or when he tells us that “schizophrenic symptoms can only be explained in representational terms” [(3), p. 18].
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A CIT, intentionality-in-mechanism vision of the cognitive, is clearly in tune with
the idea that, “The whole thrust of cognitive science is that there are sub-personal
contents and sub-personal operations that are truly cognitive in the sense that these
operations can be properly explained only in terms of these contents” [(18), p. 27,
emphasis added].
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to be clear about the source of the alleged need to do so. Notably,
if there are any such explanatory gaps to bridge, then the need to
bridge them is motivated by purely philosophical, not scientific,
considerations. Without doubt, scientists and psychiatrists seek
rich explanations of the roots of mental disorders. Providing such
explanations would require going beyond FP and delving deeply
into the sciences of the mind. However, crucially, providing such
explanations is not the same as, nor does it require, bridging
the putative intelligibility gaps – those that hold, e.g., between
neurobiology and folk psychology and with which Gerrans (3)
is concerned. Seen in this light, it becomes clear that Gerrans (3)
seeks to motivate an exclusively cognitive neuroscientific take on
SI by getting us to take seriously the need to address explanatory
requirements of a distinctively philosophical kind.
The great irony is that elsewhere SIers reject the need to
address such intelligibility demands as illegitimate. Compare the
alleged need to make sense of the interactions between cognitive
phenomena across levels by appeal to representational contents
with the alleged need to make sense of the connections that hold
between propositional attitudes in terms of rationality. If Gerrans
(3) is right, cognitive theory can help us to make intelligible how
various subpersonal cognitive phenomena inter-relate. How
might it do this? By rendering the relations between cognitive
phenomena intelligible. How? Not in RIT terms that explain
how personal-level propositional attitudes relate rationally, to be
sure, but in CIT terms that explain how neural representations
relate contentfully.
It should now be easy to see why it would be a problem for
SIers to advance this type of line. Any attempt to motivate a neurocentric cognitivist SI view by arguing that cognitive neuroscience alone can bridge otherwise unintelligible explanatory gaps
requires being sensitive to the very sort of philosophical concerns
that the SI view itself casts into doubt. Must there be some common feature (if not rationality then content) that is shared by all
mental phenomena and which unifies them and explains how
they intelligibly inter-relate? SIers say “No”: They question the
demand that “personal-level phenomena can only be explained
in terms of other personal-level phenomena” [(3), p. 21]. This
being the case, surely, we are also well within our rights to question whether there is a legitimate need for a unifying cognitive
theory that makes intelligible how various cognitive phenomena
intelligibly inter-relate in special, more-than-merely causal ways.
As the old proverb reminds us, what’s sauce for the goose is sauce
for the gander.
And there is something else to consider. We might doubt
that on close scrutiny appeals to information and representation
could play the unifying and integrating roles that would satisfy
the identified gap-bridging needs, if we were to take such needs
seriously. The fact is that apart from bearing the names “cognitive,” “representational,” or “informational” nothing in so-called
current cognitive theory deeply unifies all the various cognitive
phenomena in terms of their importantly and interestingly
diverse properties or roles.
Consider Gerran’s claim that, “a scientist explaining some
discrepant evidence is doing the same thing as the oculomotor
system controlling the trajectory of a limb” [(3), pp. 46–7,
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emphasis added]. Is this credible? Undoubtedly, there may be
some mileage in taking this route and drawing loose analogies for certain purposes. But a developed theory would be
needed to back up any such claim if taken in a serious and
literal way.17
To illustrate the point consider what Gerrans (3) has to say
about the activation-information-mode (AIM) model of dreaming, which focuses on the flow of information within and between
components of a control hierarchy. In discussing that model, he
holds that the “intrinsic cognitive properties of these components
are preserved through transitions from mode to mode. What
changes are the interactions between these components” [(3), p.
79, emphases added].
Usually, in this sort of context, cognitive theorists upgrade talk
of the flow of information to talk of the flow of informational content. Content, they hold, is what survives changes in mode and
process. Canonically, the content of a mental state is determined
by what it is about and how it represents the world to be. Now, if
information processing literally involves the trading of contents
that would make it easier to justify claiming that scientists and
information-processing systems basically do the same cognitive
work. Moreover, if content were the common coin that is always
traded in some form, everywhere in the cognitive economy, it
would be clear why there would have to be, and how there could
be, intelligible relations holding between the many and various
cognitive phenomena.
The trouble with this gambit is that it raises a host of unanswered questions. Just what is informational content anyway?
What intrinsic cognitive properties does it have? Where does it
get them? How can content be preserved through changes? How
can it make a difference to cognition? How does it relate to representational content? Is it a kind of objective commodity? Does
it make sense to say that we can take different perspectives – e.g.,
subjective and objective – toward it [as Ref. (3) appears to
assume – see, e.g., p. 17]?
Cognitive theorists can avoid these tricky questions by
sticking to an understanding of information in scientifically
In the text surrounding this claim, Gerrans (3) makes clear that he is drawing
on assumptions that predictive coding accounts of perception have made popular
to support the idea that visual systems and scientists “do essentially the same
thing.” Predictive coding accounts understand cognition as a matter of making
active inferences in continuous effort to minimize prediction error. But whether
we should think of visual systems as really making contentful inferences at all,
and whether if they do, they do so in anything like the way that scientists do, are
highly contentious topics of current debate [for reasons why we ought to prefer
a non-contentful reading of predictive processing, see Ref. (20, 21)]. For this
reason, it might seem safer for cognitivists to advance a weaker claim about what
makes these phenomena essentially the same. It might be argued that scientists
and visual systems are essentially alike because they both use representations even
though visual systems use different kinds of representation than scientists do. The
idea here is that there is no requirement that visual systems and scientists need
to operate with the same kinds of content in order to qualify as representational
systems. While it is technically correct to go this way it raises afresh the question
of what unifies and intelligibly relates these two cognitive phenomena if not the
fact that they both involve manipulations of content of the same kind. The point is
that without full details, it is far from clear why we should accept that vision and
scientific theorizing – which appear to be quite disparate cognitive activities – are
essentially alike.
17
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respectable terms – those of covariance and correspondence.
That is perfectly fine, but then it is difficult to justify claims that
basic information processing is content involving in a way, which
would license drawing a strong analogy with the theoretical
activity of scientists.
This is just one example of a disunity objection to the integrationist picture. To make a full dress case against such a vision
would require a much longer discussion [(10), esp. ch. 4]. For our
purposes, it suffices to note that anyone offering a bridge building, unifying cognitive theory must answer the sorts of questions
raised above. Prima facie, it seems they will only be able to do
so with the backing of a well-developed naturalistic theory of
content.
To highlight why such a theory is needed, consider a different
set of cases. In many of the explanations that Gerrans (3) offers of
delusions the “felt” aspect of the phenomenon in question turns
out to be a pivotal factor. The phenomenological and emotionally
charged aspects of our experience apparently matter to and help
explain some of the strong tendencies we have when responding to, interpreting, and accounting for our situations. Yet, as is
notoriously well known, we currently lack anything like a workable theory that shows how we are to understand such qualitative
phenomena in purely information processing or representational
terms. Once again, it looks like disunity rather than unity is the
word of the day.
Things are even more puzzling if we consider the roles
imaginings are meant to play in the integrative explanations on
offer by cognitive theorists, such as Gerrans (3). For example, he
holds that simulative activity generates imaginings that can be
incorporated in a wider cognitive economy. By this, he means
that imaginings can be the basis for action (including mental
action). Despite the fact that imaginings are influential and we
often act on them, they are cognitively interesting and distinct
because they lack many of the properties of canonical propositional attitudes, such as belief [(3), p. 18].
On this score Gerrans (3) tells us that

is intentional structure. But it is not clear what exactly puts the
intentionality in this structure for cognitivists if not the existence of mental representations with congruence conditions.18
Let us be clear. A simulative account of imaginings is attractive
for many reasons [(23), ch. 4]. However, it is far from clear that
imaginings without congruence conditions are best understood
as any kind of mental representation for precisely the reasons
stated above (20, 22). But even if this proves possible it would
remain unclear how a simulative account of the imagination that
emphasized the lack of congruence conditions could contribute
to a unified cognitive theory of minds.
Our capacity for producing narratives – often quite spectacular
ones – is yet another place in which it is important to recognize
that interesting forms of cognition have special properties that
break the standard representationalist mold. Gerrans (3) proposes
that particular forms of delusional thinking arise from signature
breakdowns in the usual interactions between cognitive systems.
These breakdowns in turn prompt patterns of default thinking
that take the form of experientially charged imaginative episodes.
Default thoughts of this stripe provide raw material that can be
woven together into what are, for those in the grip of a delusion,
spectacular and hypersalient narratives. Importantly, such default
thoughts “are subjectively adequate responses to experience constructed as narrative elements or fragments” [(3), p. 101].
The basic idea is that when operating in the default mode, we
assemble first pass, coherent stories. Yet even when these stories are
internally coherent, they are not always subjected to critical epistemic scrutiny. According to Gerrans (3) when unsupervised by
decontextualized systems, the products of default thinking are not
scrutinized for consistency or veridicality; they are not evaluated
against “competing narratives for accuracy or utility” [(3), p. 77].
This is hardly surprising since the great bulk of narratives do not
aim at truth. Although narratives all share certain basic structural
properties, we must look to the contexts in which we use a given
narrative in order to determine its semantic properties. Thus, as
Goldie (24) points out “Fictional narratives do not aspire to be true,
whereas real life narratives do. A narrative is fictional not in virtue
of its content being false, but in virtue of its being narrated, and read
or heard, as part of a practice of a special sort” (pp. 152–3, emphasis
added). Thus fictional narratives, offered up as fictions, invite “the
audience to imagine or make believe that what is being narrated
actually happened, even when it is known that it did not. Thus the
question of reference and of truth simply does not arise within the
‘fictive stance’” [(24), pp. 152–3]. For these reasons, Goldie concludes
that, “reference and truth have no application in fiction, but do have
application in historical and everyday explanation” [(24), p. 154].
Different kinds of narratives exhibit different kinds of semantic

Imagination uses the mind’s cognitive resources, such
as perceptual, doxastic and emotional processing to
create simulations. It thus inherits the intentional
structure of these counterpart processes. However qua
simulations imaginative states do not have congruence
conditions. [(3), p. 105].
The basic claim, which is plausible enough is that imagination
deploys specialized neural circuitry to “construct and manipulate
representations which have representational contents but no congruence conditions” [(3), p. 114, emphasis added]. Gerrans (3) is
concerned to show that simulative imagining can figure in and
make a difference to one’s thinking without the content of such
imaginings being believed.
Yet, since most theorists hold that mental content requires
some kind of correctness or congruence condition, it is puzzling in what sense imaginations can be said to have representational content if they lack such conditions altogether in the way
Gerrans (3) proposes. What remains if you subtract congruence
conditions from a mental representation? Gerrans’s (3) answer
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When thinking about what might be leftover in such a subtraction, it is useful to
consider Gerrans’s (3) claim that, “different cognitive processes have different computational properties that enable them to meet their congruence condition. These
properties provide the intentional structure of representations produced by different
cognitive processes. For example, the representations produced by the visual system
are 3D coloured scenes derived by processing spectral and luminance information”
[(3), p. 105, emphases added]. However, once no correctness conditions are in play,
it is not clear in what sense the residual structures ought to be thought to bear
representational content or even what it means to say that they do (22).
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properties, and we understand these differences if we are alert to
the roles that these different kinds of narratives play in our lives and
thinking.
A crucial contrast becomes evident if we compare the uncritical
use of narratives that do not aim at truth with the intense critical
scrutiny of beliefs and claims that do. In the most serious cases,
the latter are subject to the norms of scientific testing, where we
seek to fix what we believe only “according to standards of consistency and empirical adequacy” [(3), p. 13]. Put simply, some forms
of cognition do have representational contents and do play roles
in our cognitive economy that make them subject to epistemic
norms which simply do not apply to other forms of cognition.
Other forms of cognition lack these features. Our so-called default
thoughts – those generated when our minds are wandering or in
screensaver mode are a prime example. They do not involve any
“attempt to confirm an empirical hypothesis” [(3), p. 76].
Although the above analysis only scratches the surface, the
important thing to note is that the detailed explanations Gerrans
(3) offers of the complexities of delusional thinking gain their
power by focusing on the way diverse cognitive phenomena (e.g.,
feeling, imagining, and narrating) interact in virtue of their special
cognitive roles and properties. Contrariwise, these explanations
gain nothing from making the additional cognitivist assumption
that all mental phenomena are united because they are, somehow,
representational in character.
To tell a convincing explanatory story about minds and
how they can become disturbed in particular ways, we need to
recognize the important diversity of mental phenomena rather
than insisting on a cognitivist account that downplays those differences in favor of fulfilling a philosophically motivated demand
for unity. We can relinquish CIT and its problematic intelligibility
requirement, recasting the integrating cognitive theory in far less
ideologically demanding ways than do the friends of cognitivist
SI. This does not mean we should give up on understanding how
various mental phenomena interact or that we should not seek to
understand the roles they play in the larger cognitive economy. It
simply means that we can make sense of the relevant interactions
and relations between mental and other phenomena without
insisting that informational and representational content are
needed to account for the intelligibility of such relations.
Only if we fully free ourselves from the constraints of FP-based
philosophical suppositions about what is necessary for something
to count as a properly cognitive phenomena does it become possible to concoct accounts of cognition that are truly unconstrained
by FP thinking about the basic nature of minds. Interestingly,
radically enactivist approaches that lay stress on the importance
of interactions over contentful representations as the common
coin of the cognitive looks well placed to pick up the explanatory
burden (10). This is especially so if it is accepted that “what needs
to be explained here is not just the causal interactions among
neurons but the way those interactions enable cognitive processes
and experiences” [(3), p. 30].19

Only once the siren songs of an exclusively brain-focused future
vision for psychiatry are silenced can the ground for a suitably
open-minded and philosophically uncontaminated rendering of
the SI view be laid. This closing section shows that when modestly
formulated in the way suggested above, the SI view can make
peace with an unimperialistic vision of FP.
Consider, once again, Gerrans’s (3) plausible suggestion that
narrative-based and theory-based explanations differ in important ways because they answer to different epistemic standards.
Thus, to understand the delusional mind requires understanding how these modes of cognition interact or fail to interact in
particular conditions.
Let us assume that Gerrans’s (3) answer is along the right lines.
Let us assume, for example, that those under the sway of specific
delusions do indeed construct stories as opposed to rationally
evaluated beliefs in order to make sense of such episodes. We
might wonder, assuming they are not natural-born narrators,
how they come to be able to weave such stories? We might be
interested to know why a given kind or genre of story rather than
another is more compelling to some populations rather than
another? Or, why – upon experiencing an underlying mismatch
between what-is-felt and what-was- anticipated-would have-andshould-have-been-felt – the narratives of deluded people unfold
in one standard variant rather than another. The thing to notice is
that in order to explain and understand key features of delusional
narratives and the narrative practices that enable their generation
requires looking at socioculturally and not purely neural factors
[for extended arguments along these lines, see (23, 25–27)]. This
is especially the case when it comes to understanding the distinctive kinds of norms relevant to the sorts of cognitive activity that
differentiate narrative from scientific practices.
The point is that understanding the relevant norms requires
looking beyond the brain (27). Only outside the skull of individuals
do we find what we need for making sense of normative features of
the cognitive phenomena that need explaining. Yet it is also when
we look to certain public practices that we come by the resources
for adopting a softer take on FP and its role in therapy. Certain
kinds of treatment urge us to make best use of tools already available within cultures – such as incorporating traditional narrative
practices into therapy – in order to respond to those in need.
There are compelling reasons to agree with Gerrans (3) that
our foremost ways of making sense of ourselves and others are
grounded in explanations that are not theoretical but narratively
based. Such explanations function, primarily, as normalizing
explanations. In giving them, any of a number of explanatorily
relevant factors might be cited (e.g., facets of X’s character, X’s
mood, X’s larger projects, the content of this or that propositional
attitude of X, and so on). Crucially, like historical explanations,
these folk psychological explanations are not general and abstract
but take the form of narratives that emphasize details that are
personal and particular.

19
Enactivists, of course, encourage multi-stranded investigations, involving explanations that are pitched at various “levels” and “scales.” Gerrans (3) acknowledges
this. Taking the case of vision as a prime example, he emphasizes the need for
theories that seek to simultaneously investigate different levels of cognitive activity

Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org

and how they integrate. Yet here he notes, “Even enactive theorists of vision who
disagree with Marrians nonetheless debate with them about the causal relevance
of mechanisms at different levels” [(3), p. 43].
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Consider an idealized test case. Imagine a person suffering
from a psychiatric condition that is brought on by a cascade of
factors rooted in neural causes. Imagine that the condition can
be wholly and successfully addressed by a perfectly targeted
neuroscientific intervention. Even in this imagined case – one
that best favors a purely neurocentric vision of psychiatry in
terms of diagnosis explanation, and treatment – it is plausible
there would be a need for the person to achieve a rehabilitating self-understanding. Graham (1) captures this point when
he says:

therapy might be usefully brought to bear. And it is here that
folk psychological narrative practices are likely to play a central
role. This is because narratives are the familiar, everyday medium
through which most of us readily evaluate and reflect upon our
reasons, attitudes, and situations (24). Reviewing and recasting
our narratives, with the assistance of others, is not only a way
of making sense of our lives in new and fresh ways it can open
up possibilities for living them differently22. Narrative practices
afford such new possibilities precisely because they provide a
means for thinking afresh about “who we are” based on richer
understandings of our peculiar situations by revisiting our possible pasts and reimagining our possible futures.
Understanding FP as a kind of narrative practice in this way
connects perfectly with the ambitions of narratively based therapies that seek to use so-called “talking cures” to empower people
in the construction of a viable “future trajectory rather than
achieving past accuracy” [(1), p. 14]. FP, as a special kind of narrative practice, is a possible object of philosophical and scientific
study in a way that is wholly compatible with the modest rendering of the SI view argued for in the previous section. The views are
compatible because FP, construed as a narrative practice, is not
to be understood as a general theory embedded in that practice
from which a philosophically discernable mark of the mental that
defined mental disorders is to be sourced.23

to mend or heal from a disorder in a self-respecting
and dignified manner requires discovering a positive
or purposeful place for past and present episodes of
disorder in the … course of a person’s life … [this] often
consists of dealing with conflicting interpretations of
one’s past … [(1), p. 14].
The take-home lesson is that even in ideal cases in which targeted neural inventions might wholly relieve specific conditions
we should not typically expect psychiatric therapy to boil down
to a simple business of eradicating “disease” in the way a narrowly
construed medical model can suggest.
Murphy (2) appears prepared to acknowledge that there is a
need for psychiatry to go beyond the brain, at least in some cases.
In this vein, he states clearly that, “there are important roles for nonscientific thinking about the methods of psychiatry” [(2), p. 47].20
Importantly, even for those who press for a more thorough
brain-based vision of psychiatry, there need be no conflict
between endorsing both an SI view of the field and recognizing
the need and importance of non-scientifically focused therapies.21 When it comes to therapy, a cautious pluralism seems to be
the appropriate stance: it appears we need a variety of approaches
if we are to improve the situation of individuals. Individual
therapeutic requirements need to be assessed on a case-by-case
basis. What matters is that a pluralist approach is always possible – and typically desirable – when it comes to treatment. As
Murphy (2) rightly stresses, “Even if we have established that a
symptom is best explained in terms of one main causal factor,
such as neurotransmitter abnormality, it does not follow that
treatment must be directed at directly manipulating that causal
factor” [(2), p. 369].
This is all well and good, but Murphy (2) is almost completely
silent about which non-scientific approaches and forms to

CONCLUSION
There are excellent reasons to resist a forced choice between
standard format FP and SI views of psychiatry. On the one hand,
in its original variant, the FP view attempts to provide a definitive mark of all that is properly mental, which is imperialistic
and isolationist. On the other hand, the SI view, at least when
formulated in its popular cognitivist version, is unjustifiably
and potentially unhelpfully overly narrow and neurocentric.
Consequently, adopting either of these views of psychiatry in
their standard forms threatens to leave us with an ideological
vision of psychiatry’s future that is too extreme and too limited.
A better way forward is to salvage what is best from heavily edited
versions of the familiar versions of the FP and SI views on the
market, combining what remains to best effect.
Ultimately, the arguments presented here have been pitched
at a quite general level, whereas to make good on this plan for
reconciliation in a wholly convincing manner requires more
detailed philosophical work on case studies in ways, which it

Crucially, however, Murphy (2) insists that it is important to “distinguish between
supplementing and replacing the medical model” (p. 367).
21
Narrative therapy is, for example, neither scientifically focused nor scientifically
based. It uses special techniques in order to provide the tools for empowering
people, enabling them to exercise their agency in wider and more positive ways.
Narrative therapy, although very much in the mould of “talking cures,” is thus
unlike more familiar psychoanalytic approaches to therapy in that it does not seek
to divine and understand past causes of current trauma. Nevertheless, there seems
no reason to discount narrative therapy as a bone fide therapy given that it is has
been used successfully to help people deal better with a wide range of psychiatric
and traumatic conditions, including asthma, anorexia, bulimia, and depression.

22
Hutto DD, Gallagher S. Re-authoring narrative therapy: opening the way for
future developments. Philos Psychiatr Psychol (Forthcoming).
23
Whether FP should be understood as a narrative practice as opposed to, and
distinct from, a theory of mind remains a controversial matter of dispute in the
literature. It would take too much space to attempt to settle the issue or detail all
the consequences of going one way rather than the other, in this paper. Extended
arguments for treating FP as a narrative practice that does not reduce to theory
can be found in Ref. (23, 25–28, Hutto DD, McGivern P. Updating the story of
mental time travel: narrating and engaging with our possible pasts and futures.
In: Altshuler R, Sigrist MJ, editors. Time and the Philosophy of Action. London:
Routledge (Forthcoming)).
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